The period following the 2006 coup saw Thai politics bitterly divided between two opposing camps: red-shirted supporters 4 of the self-exiled former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted from power on charges of corruption and for disloyalty to the crown; and those who back the country ' s " network monarchy " 5 -a loose alliance of the palace, the military, the ruling Democrat Party, and the People ' s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the " yellow shirts. " 6 This contest has also exhibited itself in the online sphere as powerful members of the network monarchy exercised control over Internet communication to maintain political stability while red-shirt dissidents and their supporters evaded and resisted the control through circumvention and online civic mobilization. Notably, the new computer crime law has been a potent force in constraining the behavior of Internet users as well as service providers through the new regulatory framework it imposes. In the postcoup years, the l è se-majest é offense -insulting the monarchy -has also been increasingly used to charge anyone writing or posting material deemed to be defamatory of Thailand ' s King Bhumibol Adulyadej or the royal family, and in blocking Internet content or shutting down Web sites.
In Codes and Other Laws of Cyberspace , Lawrence Lessig notes that four major regulatory elements are at play in Internet regulation -social norms, markets, technology (what he calls architecture), and law. Each of these elements, he argues, can directly limit individuals ' actions in cyberspace through the different type of constraint each imposes, or they may work in combinations to constitute the " code " that regulates Internet users ' behavior, that is, " regulation by code. " 7 Norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes; markets constrain through the price they exact; architecture constrains through the physical burdens it imposes; and law constrains through the punishment it threatens. Lessig emphasizes that architecture is the most sensible and infl uential modality of regulation. Nevertheless, he also notes that law can also change the regulation of architecture, especially when architecture (how the network is built and designed) is changed in order to realize a particular social end.
To extend Lessig ' s notion of regulation by code a bit further, a classical Marxist theory of ruling ideology is relevant if one considers the Internet beyond its role as conduit technology and thinks more deeply about its content and communication dimensions. In Internet-restrictive countries, " code " writers tend to shape the Internet as a means to promote a certain set of views and ideas -the ideology of the ruling class -and to exclude alternative or opposition ideas or views.
Drawing on this theoretical framework, this chapter examines the recent evolution of Internet fi ltering in Thailand, focusing in particular on the period following the The study relies on extensive analysis of laws and related policies, as well as indepth interviews with stakeholders, policymakers, regulators, and members of civil society related to Internet regulation in Thailand. The discussion shows how the Internet in Thailand has turned into a contested terrain for competing values since the political change in 2006. What had been evolving as an emerging online public sphere became threatened and eroded in the postcoup years with the introduction of content-restrictive cybercrime law, an ID-enabled architecture, and the buttressing of a dominant social norm, which together constitute a schematic regulation by " code. " However, civic groups and conscientious users who do not condone this controlling scheme have resisted it by projecting freedom and transparency as underlying values while challenging the legitimacy of Internet fi ltering and censorship through different means. While the contested nature of these Internet politics is not exactly equivalent to the color-coded politics that Thailand has been infamous for in recent years, there are defi nitely strong connections and shared implications.
Background
While Internet fi ltering has been actively practiced in Thailand since 2002, it did not become a political issue until after the military coup d ' é tat of September 19, 2006. 8 The coup overthrew the highly popular Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 9 and marked the beginning of a tumultuous chapter in Thai political history. In the aftermath of the coup, the self-exiled Thaksin and his red-shirt supporters have exploited the Internet as a primary channel for political communication. 10 Meanwhile, much political expression in Thailand has resorted to cyberspace, which has enjoyed relatively greater freedom of expression than have other forms of mass media. While broadcast media in Thailand have historically been controlled through state monopoly of the airwaves, 11 and print media generally had a lukewarm attitude toward the coup, 12 throughout the postcoup period (which international observers call colorcoded politics for its red and yellow shirts), the Internet has emerged as a major public sphere. 13 Different online political forums, online newspapers, and political Web sites have become important platforms for expression, exchanges, and debates that represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies and orientations. As a result, authorities have increasingly zeroed in on Internet content as a target for censorship and surveillance in the post-2006-coup period. Since September 2006, Thailand has seen four different governments led by four different prime ministers. The fi rst postcoup PM was an appointee of the military junta, the Council for National Security (CNS), while the other three were MPs elected in 2007. The fourth prime minister -Abhisit Vejjajiva, leader of the Democrat Party, rose to power after the abrupt dissolution of the People ' s Power Party (PPP) 14 in late 2008, and the subsequent shift of alliance by a major faction in the preceding coalition government. The Democrat-led government, which was approved by the yellow shirts (the PAD) and the network monarchy, appeared to be brokered in by the military, and this alleged political illegitimacy was consistently used as a rationale by the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) in staging a series of protests against the Democrat-led government in 2009 and 2010. In March to May 2010, when the red shirts took Bangkok in a protest calling for parliament ' s dissolution and a fresh election, the survival of the Abhisit government was again put to the test. Repeated negotiations failed to set an election date. The protests escalated into prolonged violent confrontations between the protesters and the military, and attempts to negotiate a ceasefi re failed. More than 90 civilians and scores of soldiers were killed, with a total of more than 2,100 injured by the time the military successfully cracked down on the protesters on May 19. However, unrest rapidly spread throughout Thailand as red-shirt supporters clamored for justice. Many of these grievances were pouring out into cyberspace through social media where many dissidents were active.
Despite assuming offi ce under unusual circumstances -over doubts regarding his government ' s sustainability and amid grievances against government mismanagement of the 2010 bloody crackdown -Abhisit completed his second year of administration with powerful backing still intact. In 2011 he was continuing to pursue his proclaimed goals of national reform and reconciliation.
To a number of observers and political experts, Thailand ' s wrenching political struggle over the past few years also boils down to another daunting question -the fate of the country after the end of the ailing 83-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej ' s reign. Other than the issues of support for Thaksin and the September 19, 2006, coup ' s legitimacy, Thai politics has also been polarized around loyalty to the monarchy. The right-wing conservatives and pro-status-quo forces in the military and current government, the main core of the network monarchy, are insecure and fearful of what will happen after the king passes from the scene. 15 During these dubious times, cases of l è se-majest é , involving prosecution of alleged insults to the immediate royal family, have dramatically increased. Critics see charges of l è se-majest é as an effective means to silence dissent, including on the Internet. Insofar as online political communication is concerned, l è se-majest é has been the keyword in clamping down alternative viewpoints and in blocking Web sites related to Thaksin or the UDD (the red shirts). On more than one occasion, Abhisit and the Democrat-led government publicly announced that any l è se-majest é speech would not be tolerated offl ine or online. As part of their much-publicized policy to promote national reconciliation, the Abhisit-chaired cabinet approved a new agency in June 2010 to look after violations of the Computer-Related Offenses Act, in particular to protect and take care of the royal institution. 16 This complex context is necessary for a nuanced understanding of the Internetfi ltering regime in post-2006-coup Thailand. At least three regulatory elements can be delineated in this emerging fi ltering scheme: law, architecture, and social norms. Since the CDR ' s Order No. 5 was enforced concurrently with martial law in the period immediately after the coup, it will not be discussed here.
The Computer-Related Offenses Act B.E. 2550 (2007)
The Computer-Related Offenses Act B.E. 2550, better known as the Computer Crime Law, was the very fi rst legislation to be passed by the CNS-appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA), an interim legislature after the coup. 18 Although the initial drafting of the law began in 1996, it was not actually passed until 2007, following an international controversy in April 2007 when the junta-appointed minister of MICT banned video clips deemed insulting to the Thai king and threatened to sue YouTube for carrying them. This threat of a lawsuit came after failed requests to YouTube to take down the problematic clips.
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Since its enactment, the computer crime law has been controversial, particularly its negative implications for online freedom of expression. Unlike conventional cybercrime law, which does not regulate content, 20 the Thai Computer-Related Offenses Act classifi es content offenses committed on a computer as another major offense category in addition to offenses committed against computer systems or computer data. Section 14 of the law defi nes offenses as the import into a computer system of • forged or false computer data, in a manner that is likely to cause damage to a third party or the public.
• false data in a manner likely to damage national security or to cause public panic.
• data constituting an offense against national security under the penal code; and pornographic data in a manner that could be publicly accessible. 21 According to recently published research on online censorship through law and policy in Thailand, two major types of offenses can be delineated from prosecution charges fi led under the 2007 Computer-Related Offences Act: 22 (1) offenses against computer systems or data and (2) show that the main emphasis in the enforcement of the new law is on content regulation rather than computer crimes that use computers as tools or aim at computer system as targets. National security is the main keyword for content offenses, most likely because it includes l è se-majest é (insulting the royal family), which is a taboo and a serious crime in Thai society.
The law also imposes severe sanctions for violators. For offenses against computer systems or computer data, the penalties include imprisonment of between six months and 20 years and/or a fi ne of between THB 10,000 (approximately USD 300) and 300,000 THB (approximately USD 9,036) while penalties for content offenses range from imprisonment for up to fi ve years and/or a fi ne of up to THB 100,000 (approximately USD 3,012). 23 Furthermore, the law grants broad powers to offi cials to investigate and gather evidence of a suspected offense committed by computer. Rather than suggesting the least intrusive action that will support their investigation, the law allows broad-based surveillance, censorship, and control of Internet-based activities. Competent offi cials, who are appointed by the minister of ICT, are authorized to do a range of things including summoning alleged parties to appear; requesting information and evidence; duplicating, decrypting, censoring, and accessing computer information; and confi scating or " freezing " computer systems.
In addition to granting these powers, the enforcement of the Computer-Related Offenses Act has important consequences for the regulation of Thai cyberspace, as follows:
Legalizing blocking of Internet content
Prior to the passing of the computer crime law, blocking of Internet content, which has been practiced since 2002 by the MICT, was always criticized for lack of legal grounds. Critics have alluded to constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom of expression when attacking the blocking ' s illegality. For instance, the fi rst clause in section 45 of the constitution reads, " A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make speeches, write, print, publicize, and make expression by other means. " The section goes on to prohibit the shutdown of media outlets like newspapers and broadcasting. While the Internet is never addressed in this constitutional provision, many cyber libertarians still see the Internet as a form of mass media that warrants the same protection. But with the passing and enforcement of the new computer crime law, blocking of Internet content is now legalized, falling as it does under the category of an offense. As section 20 of the law reads:
In case the offences according to this law involve the publicizing of computer information that may have negative implications to national security as indicated in Part II of this law or as prescribed in 1/1 of the penal code or which may violate public order or good morals of the people, the competent offi cials, with approval from the appointed Minister, may petition, with supporting evidence, to the court within the jurisdiction, to halt the spread of such computer information.
If the court issues an order to block the spread of information as in clause 1, competent offi cials may block the spread of that information themselves or request service providers to block the spread of that information.
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As a result, Internet fi ltering, which was a controversial issue in the past, is now considered legal. Since the act fi rst came into effect, the MICT has applied section 20 to order thousands of Web sites alleged to contain l è se-majest é or pornographic materials to be blocked. Cracking down on l è se-majest é content has been identifi ed as the MICT ' s policy priority. 25 While the law specifi es that a court warrant is mandatory, the actual enforcement has not been entirely strict. Based on interviews conducted as part of this study with selected Internet service providers, " requests for cooperation " from government agencies like the MICT and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) do not always come furnished with court orders. The usual objectives of such requests are obtaining log fi les of Internet traffi c, blocking problematic Web sites, and deleting problematic postings in online discussion forums. The requests often plainly make reference to provisions in the Computer-Related Offenses law, but without court orders. Although many service providers have qualms about blocking Internet content, they do not have any option but to comply.
Indirect regulation via intermediary providers and self-censorship of online content providers
The computer crime law enables the state to regulate intermediary providers who in turn regulate users. Section 15 of the law creates the burden of intermediary liability by imposing the same penalty on offenders as on intermediaries, regardless of prior knowledge or intent. It claims that " any service providers [who] knowingly or unknowingly support or allow offenses indicated in Section 14 to be committed in the computer or system under his control shall receive the same penalties as offenders under Section 14 " 26 (my emphasis).
According to the law, no distinction is made between network providers who act as mere conduits and content providers who actually host content in the way they are held liable for harmful or illegal content. Whether or not the providers have actual knowledge of the content in question or whether they quickly remove the content after becoming aware of it does not grant any immunity. However, the law does not extend liability to search engines and portals that provide links to illegal content.
Because of this intermediary liability enforcement, Internet intermediariesnetwork and content alike -have set up new measures to regulate content and in the process are passing regulatory constraints onto users. These measures are summarized in table 5.2 .
Keeping a log fi le of Internet traffi c is intended for investigation purposes, but the real target is the identity of users. In Thailand, where a civil registration system has been an inherent part of society for almost a century, it is relatively easy to pair IP addresses with citizen identifi cation, since all service applications require the 13-digit citizenidentifi cation number. While larger operators like Internet service providers (ISPs) can integrate this legal requirement into their existing operation, smaller providersoperators of Web sites, Web-hosting services, online discussion forums, and providers of institutional servers -have to set up some new form of identifi cation and certifi cation clearance system that makes users ' network access conditional on providing credentials. In the case of Internet caf é s, since they do not provide network service, customers are required to sign their names and citizen IDs in a logbook before using the service.
Meanwhile, medium to large organizational servers -academic institutions, companies, government agencies, and some Internet caf é s -that provide Internet access are increasingly installing fi ltering software on their systems, using a keyword or groups of keywords as criteria. Filtering criteria depend mainly on the policy of each organization, but the types of content offenses provided in the computer crime law are usually included.
SERVICE PROVIDERS ' NEW REGULATORY MEASURES THAT CREATE INDIRECT REGULATION OF USERS AS A RESULT OF THE COMPUTER-RELATED OFFENSES
Internet service providers also administer surveillance on interactive Web sites like online discussion forums and chat rooms that have registered IP addresses under their networks. For instance, CAT Telecom, a major ISP, administers this content-monitoring scheme through an in-house unit called Internet Data Center (IDC). An IDC staff member will periodically examine exchanges in online discussion forums, particularly political forums. If l è se-majest é content is found, IDC will inform the moderators of the particular online forum and give them 30 minutes to remove the content. If the content is not deleted within that time, CAT Telecom will block access to the IP address that hosts the online discussion forum.
As for operators of online discussion forums themselves, a 24-hour monitor of postings on the forum has been in place since the law came into force. While moderators of such forums make it part of their daily routine to remove illegal or harmful content, most feel reluctant and view the new law with much apprehension. The Web moderator of Prachatai ( http://www.prachataiwebboard.com ), Chiranuch Premchaiporn, who is now awaiting trial on intermediary liability charges fi led under this law, described the main effect of the law being " a transfer of censorship from state agencies to webmaster, with the law as choker. " 27 The late Somkiat Tangnamo, 28 webmaster of http://www.midnightuniv.org , admitted that he self-censored on l è se-majest é to an unprecedented level during the Abhisit government ' s rule. Evidently, selfcensorship has become the prevalent practice for moderators of online forums, particularly politically oriented ones. See table 5.3 for a summary of such self-censorship/ regulation practices during the post-coup period. Although there has not yet been a study to examine online citizen reporters and their reaction to Internet fi ltering, related research shows that bloggers engaged in citizen journalism regulate content through codes of practice. In the case of OK Nation Blog, a popular journalistic blog, member bloggers develop their own sets of codes and practices, which closely observe provisions in the computer crime law and related laws like l è se-majest é . 29 In effect, legal provisions are incorporated into citizen reporters ' codes and thereby become a framework for the self-regulation of bloggers.
The Emergency Decree on Government Administration Internal Security Act (ISA) B.E. 2551 was passed in November 2007 by the militaryinstalled legislature -the NLA. The ISA establishes an Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), directed by the prime minister and the commander-in-chief of the army. The ISOC has the power to have relevant government offi cials implement any action or withhold the implementation of any action. Both laws have imposed far-reaching restrictions on the right to free expression, peaceful assembly, and freedom of movement, and the right to a fair judicial process. During the political turmoil in April 2009, both laws were invoked on more than one occasion in certain districts of Bangkok during demonstrations by the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). The enforcement of these laws enabled the MICT and other government agencies to exercise broad-based censorship and surveillance of the media, including the Internet.
During the " Red Shirt Protests " from April to May 2010, a signifi cant number of red-shirt sites were targeted and blocked, following a block list issued under the Emergency Decree that ordered 36 Web sites to be fi ltered. During this period ONI conducted tests on two major ISPs -state-run TOTNET and TRUE, a private telecommunications conglomerate. The testing found blocked sites under common content categories in both ISPs as follows: free expression and media freedom, gambling, political reform groups, and social networking. However, TOTNET was found to have fi ltered almost twice the number of sites (29 URLs) than TRUE and more content categories. For example, anonymizer and circumvention sites were blocked by TOTNET but not by TRUE. Signifi cantly, neither TRUE nor TOTNET fi ltered the entire block list, with TOTNET blocking only 10 URLs from the list and TOTNET fi ltering this same set and an additional 13 for a total of 23 URLS. 30 Meanwhile, community radio stations and cable television stations were raided, and satellite television stations ' signals were cut off. 31 While it is in effect, the Emergency Decree supersedes all other laws. It has been attacked by critics as an authoritarian piece of legislation that allows unprecedented state control. L è se-majest é is also classifi ed under Offenses Relating to the Security of the Kingdom in Thailand ' s penal code. It has always been part of the code and rarely subject to change since its inception in 1957. Thai authorities treat l è se-majest é as a matter of national security, and cases of l è se-majest é usually entail severe punishment. This fact is evident in section 112 of the penal code, which reads, " Whoever defames, insults, or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fi fteen years. " 33 The royalist Democrat government, which has ruled since late 2008, recently proposed to Parliament a legal amendment that will raise prison sentences for l è se-majest é to a maximum of 25 years. The amendment will also add a maximum fi ne of one million baht (about USD 28,500). Currently, l è se-majest é carries no fi ne. An analysis of legal prosecutions related to Internet content since the 2006 coup shows that l è se-majest é was the leading offense. When bringing charges of defaming the monarch on the Internet, the police will usually cite section 14 of the computer crime law together with section 112 of the penal code, since the offense is covered by provisions in both pieces of legislation. See table 5.4 for analysis of prominent cases of Internet content offenses during the post-2006-coup period.
Of all the content offenses charged, the only unresolved case is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, webmaster of Prachatai. The interesting point about Chiranuch ' s case is that she was fi rst charged with only the computer crime law under an intermediary liability charge because the alleged l è se-majest é comment was posted by a forum user and not by herself. However, in September 2010 she was arrested on multiple charges including l è se-majest é for an interview published on the Web site in 2008 with a man who was arrested and charged with l è se-majest é for refusing to stand up during the royal anthem in a movie house. 34 It should be noted that l è se-majest é cases have also increased offl ine. From 2008 to 2009, at least four cases were charged, alongside those in cyberspace:
• A local man, Chotisak Onsoong, went to a movie and refused to stand up while the royal anthem played before the movie. He was later arrested after the movie operator reported him to the police for an act deemed an insult to the king. 35 • An Australian man, Harry Nicolaides, was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison for having published a book that defames the crown prince. 36 He later received a royal pardon and was immediately deported to Australia.
• Political science professor Giles Ungpakorn was summoned for questioning for an alleged l è se-majest é charge. He later fl ed to England, for fear of not getting a fair trial.
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• Political activist Daranee Chancheongsilapakul, also known as Da Torpedo, was convicted of l è se-majest é and sentenced to a combined jail term of 18 years. Daranee reportedly made a series of infl ammatory speeches against the king and the 2006 coup at one of the red-shirt political rallies. The arrestee was bailed out on THB 200,000 (USD 6,600) bail. She was expected to report to Khon Kaen provincial police station, where the arrest warrant was issued, once a month until the case is either dismissed or fi led to the public prosecutor. 
Architecture: From Automatic URL Filtering to an ID-Enabled Cyberspace

Automatic URL Filtering
After the September 2006 coup, the MICT was faced with mounting complaints over l è se-majest é cases, which were reportedly mushrooming on anticoup and pro-Thaksin Web sites. The existing IP-based fi ltering at ISP levels, based on block lists circulated by MICT, was deemed ineffective and was also criticized for overblocking. The interim minister of ICT thus revisited the idea of an automatic Internet fi ltering system, which was discussed in the later years of the Thaksin administration but did not materialize. As a result, a feasibility study was carried out, and a pilot project was commissioned to local researchers. The new automatic fi ltering system was installed at the level of international Internet gateway (IIG), 39 which is a higher level of networking than national Internet exchange (NIX) or ISPs. 40 All IIGs under CAT Telecom Plc were the fi rst to be installed with the new automatic fi ltering system, since CAT Telecom is a state enterprise and reports directly to the MICT. The fi ltering technology was developed by a group of computer-engineering researchers at the Bangkok-based Kasetsart University. The URL fi ltering technique was originally developed to fi lter out unwanted content such as spam but could also be used to fi lter Web access by blocking at application layers or at URL levels. 41 The system began a trial run in 2008 and has been fully operational since early 2009. Essentially, the URL fi ltering technique uses what Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve call proxy-based fi ltering strategies. 42 Internet traffi c passing by the fi ltering system is reassembled, and the specifi c HTTP address being accessed is checked against a list of blocked URLs or blocked keywords in the URL. When users attempt to access these URLs, they are subsequently blocked. But instead of showing an MICT block page indicating that the site has been blocked (as would be the case of IP blocking at ISP level), the new system has created a block page that looks like the browser ' s default error page, possibly to disguise the fact that the government is blocking these sites.
ID-Enabled Cyberspace
Largely because of enforcement of the computer crime law, online service providers (OSPs) -those that host social networking services, blogs, and Web sites -have increasingly set up a system that enables " traceability regulation. " 43 To access content and services on these Web sites, users are required to provide some sort of identifi cation or certifi cation fi rst. Using traceability regulation as a framework, we surveyed popular local online services like online discussion forums, blogs, social networking services, portals, and online newspapers. The results are shown in table 5.5 . The most minimal forms of identifi cation and certifi cation required in all surveyed OSPs are user name and password for logging into the system. For registration, all providers require an e-mail address as a precondition for access, while some require name, address, and phone number, and a few require the 13-digit citizen identifi cation number. In any case, it is apparent that an architecture of identifi cation has been established in the Thai cyberspace as a result of the new computer crime law.
Social Norms: A Benevolent and Inviolable Kingship
While l è se-majest é may sound peculiar to non-Thais, it has been a deep-seated concept in Thai culture for centuries. The monarchy has always been a central institution in Thai society. Despite the 1932 revolution that changed the governing regime from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, the king was still allowed to exercise sanctioning prerogatives of legitimization. At that time, the fi rst constitution was regarded as a royal gift, while the throne was generally viewed as holding a position of moral superiority over the new political leadership. This view still appears to prevail today.
In past and present constitutions, the monarch, as the head of state, has these privileges:
1. He is to be unreservedly respected: his person is inviolable, and he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. 2. He is the Head of the State. 3. He is the soul of the nation and the font of national harmony. 4. He is above politics. 5. He is politically neutral, without aligning with any political group or party. 6. He can do no wrong (constitutionally).
Furthermore, the Thai conception of kingship is a combination of the Hindu divine right of deva raja and the Buddhist patriarchal kingship in which the king rules according to the law or dharma. Therefore, the legitimacy of the monarch is derived not only from divine right but also from his own conduct and commendable deeds. The present king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, who is now the world ' s longest-reigning monarch, has been credited for his lifelong dedication to rural development and the livelihoods of his poorest subjects. He is thus well loved and respected by the general Thai public. In 2006 on the 60th anniversary of his coronation, the entire country glowed yellow as loyal supporters of the king donned special yellow royal shirts in celebration everywhere throughout the year.
With exceptional privileges, conceptual dominance, and public reverence, the Thai monarchy has been used as a source of legitimacy in Thai politics. A former prime minister (1957 -1963) and military dictator, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, made extensive use of the monarchy to legitimize his regime both domestically and internationally. This legitimization often happens at the expense of free speech. In the past, dissidents who were charged with l è se-majest é were usually social critics or those who openly resented military involvement in politics. Meanwhile, fi lers of l è se-majest é suits were typically from the military.
Traditionally, the monarchy has been identifi ed as one of the core values to be protected under national security, which includes three things -the monarchy, religion (Buddhism), and the Thai nation. Any attempt to undermine these so-called three pillars of Thai society would be viewed as a threat to national security. As these core values are usually fused together, it is not uncommon for a show of disrespect, including criticism of the king, to be interpreted as " unpatriotic. "
There has always been tension between free speech and royalism in Thailand, but never has the anxiety been so great as in the age of the Internet and a time of foreseeable royal succession. With the borderless and robust nature of the Internet, it is no longer feasible to keep the king virtually beyond criticism in the virtual world. But no matter how futile and ultraconservative l è se-majest é fi ltering may appear to some liberal people, there are those who support it and even participate in monitoring Web sites and reporting l è se-majest é to authorities. Statistics released by the MICT show that the greatest number of complaints received on Internet content had to do with l è se-majest é . 44 
Reaction from Civil Society and Mechanisms for Addressing Internet Filtering
In response to Internet fi ltering issues, members of civil society have reacted in a number of ways and used varying strategies to deal with new regulatory constraints. Members of civil society also contest what they conceive to be the government ' s abuse of power and violation of free speech online.
Online Security Caution
According to interviews with selected civil society activists, tightening up security in their online use seems to be the top strategy in coping with authorities ' censorship and surveillance. This approach was manifested most frequently in their technological choice. For instance, a few Internet advocacy activists said they deliberately gave up the more popular Windows platform and opted instead for Linux as an operating system. Some also chose to disable the conversation-recording feature of Gtalk and turn on the secure access feature (SSL) in Gmail. The majority are very cautious about their passwords. Not only do they keep their passwords as their most confi dential information, but they also change passwords frequently. Their choice of password is also crucial. One online activist said he avoided words in the dictionary and used multiple layers of password protection. In using social media like Facebook or Twitter, a few activists noted that they exercise more caution in accepting friends or in setting the circle to which their personal information will be accessible. Similarly, in using online discussion forums, these activists are careful in posting comments and in registering their personal information to the Web sites. Usually, they do not give anything beyond their e-mail address to avoid being identifi ed.
Evasion and Circumvention
When it comes to Web censorship, a number of users wishing to access blocked Internet content can fi nd easy ways around it by using proxy or VPN or using Google translate or Google cache. But with Web 2.0 applications and social media, things are a bit more complicated to get around. At this level, OSPs that rent out server space to a large number of Web site developers and operators of social media platforms are becoming increasingly important as intermediary censors for online content. Ethan Zuckerman refers to OSPs ' role in Internet fi ltering as " intermediary censorship. " 45 They have become important choke points for Web users who publish content on Web servers they do not control. Such censorship is observed in at least three online political discussion forums that the research team studied in the postcoup period. These fi ndings are summarized in table 5.6 . The summary in table 5.6 clearly shows that because a number of smaller Internet providers rely on them to publish content, OSPs can be powerful entities in controlling online speech. But the same summary also shows that this newer generation of Internet publishers is savvy enough to circumvent such intermediary fi ltering systems by exploiting alternative hosting services overseas. While this strategy may not solve their problem entirely -since the state can still block through URL-fi ltering at the IIG level -it still suggests that cyber citizens make efforts to redress the problem with whatever technological options are available.
Campaigning for Local and International Support
Based on interviews with civil society members, their most immediate concern about Internet fi ltering in Thailand is the new computer crime law. To them, the new law is more of an effort by the after-coup government to curb threats against national security and the monarchy, rather than to stop cybercriminality. In response to arrest cases under this very law, several rights-based groups have campaigned in support of the arrestees. The most obvious case is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, who has been arrested twice with charges under the same law. (See details about Chiranuch ' s arrest in table 5.4.) Because Chiranuch is a member of the prominent online freedom advocacy group -the Thai Netizen Network (TNN) 46 -her case has been continuously reported in Prachatai (until it was blocked by the emergency decree during the redshirt crisis of March to May 2010) and in other alternative online media including mailing lists of TNN. Ever since Chiranuch ' s fi rst arrest in March 2009, campaigns to support her and Internet freedom, using her case as a rallying point, have been growing steadily.
First, only the TNN and alliance organizations like Campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR) 47 and Freedom against Censorship Thailand (FACT) 48 joined forces.
Gradually, other local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) joined the campaign to free Chiranuch (also known by her nickname Jiew) by submitting an open letter seeking the immediate dropping of charges against her and dissuading public prosecutors from pursuing trial. These include the Network of Human Rights Lawyers, the Project on Legal Environment, and the Association for Civil Rights and Liberties. Subsequently, the circle grew to more regional participation with the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), Southeast Asian Media Legal Defense (SEAMLD), which is a regional spin-off from the global Media Legal Defense Initiative (MLDI), International involved. These organizations ' main criticism is directed at Thailand ' s censorship policy and its impact on human rights and free speech, especially in cyberspace. Both the new computer crime law and l è se-majest é have been criticized as tools to suppress dissent and persecute political opponents. After Chiranuch ' s second arrest in September 2010, a wider circle of Internet users promoted her cause through social media. Examples include a campaign using " free jiew " as a tag on the popular micro-blogging site Twitter ( https://twitter.com/search?q =%23freejiew ); blogs dedicated to the cause ( http://freejiew.blogspot.com ); and a platform set up by Digital Democracy to receive donations in support of her bail ( http:// digitaldemocracy.chipin.com/free-jiew ).
Public Advocacy and Policy Lobbying
Alongside campaigning for support at local and international levels for Chiranuch ' s case, civil society organizations have also been active in advocating for public awareness about Internet restrictions in Thailand. In fact, advocacy work through public education has been the core work of the TNN, of which Chiranuch is a founding member. For the past two years, TNN has been at the forefront in organizing meetings, seminars, and public forums on issues related to Internet freedom. For instance, in August 2010, TNN, together with Media 4 Democracy and SEAPA, organized a highprofi le seminar on the Computer-Related Offenses Act, on its third anniversary. A former information minister, an online newspaper webmaster, a popular blogger, a media watch representative, and Chiranuch herself shared comments on the computer crime law ' s impact on democratization in Thailand. The common sentiment is that restrictive law and careless enforcement during political polarization will contribute negatively to democracy because self-censorship becomes the rule for safety, hence deterring debate and the climate of opinion that are so fundamental to democracy.
In addition to public education, civil society has also used policy lobbying as another avenue to redress Internet control issues. In early 2009, several rights groups, including TNN, CPMR, and FACT, submitted an open letter to current Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva demanding an amendment of the computer crime law to make it more transparent and less politically motivated. Although Abhisit stressed civil liberties in his inauguration speech in December 2008, he has ruled out a repeal of the computer crime law.
Ambivalence and Indifference
In contrast to the stance and strategies taken by NGOs and activists, key institutional bodies responsible for human rights in Thailand are not only slow in responding to complaints about impediments to freedom from enforcement of the new computer law, but they have also been ambivalent in the face of l è se-majest é and the protection of national security. According to the chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a post-1997 reform independent organization, the MICT ' s Internet blocking is a new challenge for many organizations, including NHRC. There are still few complaints at NHRC about Internet fi ltering as a violation of the freedom of expression -compared to other more pressing issues such as exploitation of natural resources, abuse of power, and governmental malpractice. The complicated nature of the Internet has also contributed to Thai institutions ' limited understanding of the seriousness of the situation.
The NHRC usually refers ICT-related complaints, including online blocking, to the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), an independent telecommunications regulator and now interim regulator of broadcasting. While acknowledging that violations of freedom do exist on the Internet, the NHRC also admitted they lack the necessary technical and legal expertise to deal with the problem.
Apart from the NHRC, another avenue where people can address Internet fi ltering issues is through human-rights-related commissions attached to the House of Parliament and the Senate. However, an interview with one chairperson of such a commission -the House commission on human rights, freedom, and consumer protection -revealed a rather conservative stance. Absolute freedom, this person argued, can threaten national security, especially when it involves the monarchy. The reverence of the monarchy, he stressed, is unique to Thai society and shall not be compromised at any cost. In this light, the new computer crime law is a justifi ed effort by the government to properly regulate Internet use by balancing freedom of expression with national security. The chairperson feels that the judicial system is always open for online civil rights groups to tap if the rights to communicate and freedom of expression online are violated by the law.
Conclusion
At a glance, the politics of Internet fi ltering in Thailand may only refl ect the larger political struggle between pro-and anti-Thaksin forces or between pro-and antimonarchy forces. But a closer examination yields another type of politics beyond the dominant color-coded politics. This politics of the Thai Internet code involves a subtle relationship between different elements in the regulation of Thai cyberspace.
In the post-2006-coup experience, the Computer-Related Offenses Act of 2007, a product of the coup-installed legislature, appears to be a major driving force in shaping the cyber experience in Thailand. A number of new regulatory practices have resulted, including the following:
• Legalizing of blocking at network levels.
• Indirect regulation by intermediary providers, which gave rise to intermediary censorship by online service providers and self-censorship of online content providers.
• Creating an ID-enabled architecture that promotes traceability regulation.
• Incorporating censorship into the cyber community ' s code of practice.
• Self-censorship by users in the online public sphere.
Other laws such as the Emergency Decree, the Internal Security Act of 2007, and l è se-majest é laws also help intensify regulatory restraints with the elements of surveillance and punishment. Gradually, Internet operators -network, service, and contentand Internet users in Thai society have learned to integrate these legal provisions into their cyber behavior. While it is true that l è se-majest é law has been in existence since 1957, its actual enforcement or looming possibility of enforcement has never been as evident as in the present period. I for one still remember the early days of the Internet in the early 1990s in which Thai Net users exchanged opinions on the future of the monarchy on Bulletin Board Service (BBS) using anonymous e-mails. The Internet was free and unregulated because it was diffi cult to identify the user or poster of comments. This is no longer true in Thai cyberspace, since everyone is now visible and traceable through the new ID-enabled architecture.
Notably, the increased transparency of the Thai Internet is made possible by indirect regulation from the new law. As users are forced to give self-authenticating facts to service providers in order to gain access to the Net, they have contributed directly to the regulation of their own behavior in cyberspace. The new law has changed the regulation of architecture through design constraints that condition netizens ' access to cyberspace.
Meanwhile, automatic URL fi ltering, which involves more subtle fi ltering design than IP blocking, has also led to a greater technical capability to deny access to information resources while reducing the possibility of blockers being discovered. Though not directly related to the new law, this new technological design has indeed made fi ltering more malleable and more effective.
The law and the architecture aside, social norms also have a powerful role to play in the Thai politics of Internet fi ltering. The respect and reverence for the monarchy, particularly for the current king who has reigned for more than 62 years, is a deeprooted norm in Thai society. Whether l è se-majest é is legitimate or not may be a moot point. What is clear is that this enigmatic norm carries with it high sensitivity in cyberspace as well as in the " real " world. Alongside the increase in prosecution cases related to l è se-majest é speech online and offl ine, there has also been growing evidence of participatory forms of censorship -by service providers, content operators, and users -against l è se-majest é . While this participatory censorship is partly a consequence of the climate of fear arising from the new computer law and strict enforcement of l è se-majest é law, the law is not an isolated cause. After all, as Lessig rightly notes, norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes, while law constrains through the punishment it threatens. In the Thai scenario, both elements apply.
Post-2006 Thailand is an interesting time and place to study Internet censorship and control. In this unique context, an ideological struggle is being played out between the old norm of preserving the sanctity of a revered institution that unites the nation and the new norm of free speech that could disrupt national order. If this ideological contest continues, we are likely to see more fi ltering, more cyber surveillance, more cyber policing, and more " rule of law " being used to suppress and undermine human rights and free speech online. In the meantime, civil society will employ more tools and options to circumvent politically motivated censorship through wider and higher circles of advocacy, to ultimately prove that freedom is not a crime. 12. The Thai printed press, which has always been an important institution in shaping public opinion and setting public agenda, came under heavy criticism for condoning the coup. Notably, three leaders of professional media organizations/associations were appointed by the junta to be in the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), an interim legislature. Also, the printed media were able to push for the passage of a liberal print notifi cation law to replace the draconian and authoritarian print law during the NLA term. 
